Legislature(1999 - 2000)
05/04/1999 08:45 AM House FIN
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HOUSE BILL NO. 214 "An Act relating to litigation involving correctional facilities; and amending Rules 59(f), 60(b), 62, and 65, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure." CO-CHAIR MULDER, SPONSOR, spoke in support of HB 214. He noted that the legislation is an attempt to hold down spiraling costs in the Department of Corrections. He observed that the Department of Law indicated that it might be time for the legislature to go forward with its own version of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, similar to the one that passed the federal government several years ago. He observed that the legislature passed a resolution requesting the Department of Law to petition the court, under rule 60(b), for the termination of the Cleary decree. The Department of Law felt that the case was not strong enough under rule 60(b). The Department of Law helped to draft HB 214. House Bill 214 places a definite timeline on consent decrees and court orders. He noted that the state is living under the Cleary Consent Decree, which was initiated in the early 1980's. Co-Chair Mulder explained that under the legislation, consent decrees or court orders would be held for two years. After two years the plaintiffs would have to prove that a constitutional violation remained in order to maintain the consent decree or court order. He stressed that the Department of Law could still enter into a consent decree. The legislation only provides a mechanism by which the department can petition the court for the termination of a decree or court order. Co-Chair Mulder maintained that Cleary drives a lot of the state's correctional costs. The Legislature appropriated an additional $10 million dollars in FY 99 in order to bring the state into compliance with the Cleary settlement. He pointed out that in a time of declining state revenues that the correctional system should not be held to a higher standard than other needs of the state. He maintained that the court monitor determines if the state is in compliance and how much money should be spent. He emphasized that the courts are indirectly utilizing their power to affect appropriations. Representative J. Davies questioned if the legislation limits the ability of the court to impose a decision. Co- Chair Mulder noted that if a violation to a constitutional right exists the court could put in place an order. After two years if the department has taken corrective action the department can petition the court to discontinue the order. Then it would be incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the fact that the violation still exists. Representative J. Davies stated that the plaintiffs would have to keep proving their case over and over again. Co- Chair Mulder asked if that would be wrong in relation to prison conditions, when corrective steps have been taken. Representative J. Davies stressed that the court has found that the state has not fulfilled the terms of the Cleary agreement. He pointed out that the agreement was outside of the court. The state agreed to provide certain conditions. He noted that if the state does not fulfill its obligations the plaintiffs would have to prove again that they are owed by the state. Co-Chair Mulder argued that the Department of Law signed onto the Cleary settlement. The Legislature has made it clear that it does not agree with the conditions and terms of the Cleary settlement. He pointed out that at the time of the settlement there were no constitutional violations. The lower Court found that, while the state of Alaska had some of the safest prisons in the United States, that the conditions that existed had a potential to create a problem in the future. He maintained that not all of the components of the Cleary court decree speak to constitutional protections. He gave the example of the degree to which food should be heated. Representative J. Davies stressed that representatives of the state found it in the state of Alaska's interest to agree to the stipulations, even if they did not rise out of a constitutional right. He noted that it might be in the state's interest to agree to a lesser standard to avoid a greater cost. He asked if the legislation would take away the possibility of a similar consideration in the future. Co-Chair Mulder reiterated that the court could still find in favor of prisoners if there is a constitutional violation. The court can still impose the sanction and the remedy to the department. He asserted that the Cleary settlement acts as law in relationship to the Department of Corrections and drives the department's cost. Representative J. Davies disagreed that the settlement is in effect law. He argued that it is no different from any other state contract. He asserted that the affect of the legislation is that "the state doesn't want to be bound to a contract, this specific kind of contract, for more than two years." Co-Chair Therriault questioned if the provisions only apply to consent decrees in the Department of Corrections. MICHAEL STARK, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF LAW explained that the legislation is patterned after the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act, which was adopted in response to consent decrees and court orders that were imposed in litigation cases. He noted that the consent decrees and court orders assumed a life of the own. They went on in many cases for 10 or 20 years. They addressed problems that were real at the time when the orders were first entered. Once federal problems were addressed the states found themselves unable to get out from under the court orders. He maintained that the hands of the executive branches and legislatures were tied in terms of appropriations and flexibility in managing prisons. He asserted that the court systems end up, in one degree or another, managing the prison systems. The legislation is directed at litigation involving conditions in correctional facilities or actions of government officers that affect prisoners' lives. It does not affect the right to sue in any other area. If there is a violation of a state statute, state constitutional provision, federal constitutional provision or federal statute the court has authority to impose orders. If the state feels that the problems have been addressed it can go to the court and move to terminate the order. If plaintiffs demonstrate that the rights are still being violated then the court has the authority to continue the order. The legislation only allows the state to move on with its duties when the problems are fixed. Mr. Stark reviewed the Cleary case. He noted that the case was filed in 1980. At that time there were very few resource being devoted to the state's correctional system. In 19983 the Division of Corrections entered into a settlement agreement that addressed many of the issues. The big-ticket items were left for trial. There was a trial in 1984. The court found that Alaska's system was one of the safest and most humane in the country. It also found that while it was not presently overcrowded, it would shortly be overcrowd, based on statistics developed in the trial. The court imposed population caps. The state appealed the court's decision since there was not violation. It took several years for the case to come to the Supreme Court. In the meantime the prison population had grown. The state decided that they could get more mileage from the plaintiffs than from the courts, so they settled. The state's hands were partially tied because of the partial settlement. He noted that most of the problems have been corrected. He acknowledged that there are still problems with overcrowding. He emphasized that prison population drives the correctional costs. Co-Chair Therriault asked if there are limitations on the length of contracts. Mr. Stark noted that all contracts are dependent on legislative appropriation. If the legislature decides not to fund a contract, the contract becomes null and void. He further explained that the legislation would not affect the award of damages. The legislation only affects prospective relief. In response to a question by Co-Chair Therriault, Mr. Stark stated that the department supports the legislation. He discussed the chance of a constitutional challenge. He noted that the federal legislation has been supported in the courts. It has not been challenged in the Supreme Court. Representative J. Davies expressed concern with the legislation. He stated that the state could delay actions to address a court order. Plaintiffs would then be forced to prove the case again. He maintained that the state should have the burden of demonstrating that the issues have been addressed. Mr. Stark pointed out that a violation of constitutional protections or state statutes were not proven in the Cleary decision. Representative J. Davies emphasized that the irrelevant issue is that the state entered into a contract. He maintained that the state would have lost the court case. Co-Chair Mulder asked if state should be able to get out from under Cleary. Mr. Stark stated that the Department of Corrections has shown that it can operate at higher capacities, for periods of time, than were established by Cleary without violating the Constitution. He stressed that the Department of Corrections is not interested in having prisoners stacked up, but emphasized that the state is entitled to the flexibility to manage. He maintained that the court should not dictate to the executive branch and legislature how operate the prison system unless a law is being violated. Co-Chair Therriault questioned if the settlement rose out of the state's ability to pay the settlement at the time. Mr. Stark stated that the settlement was entered into because the state did not think that the prison population would increase to the extent that it did. Representative J. Davies asked why the burden would be placed on the plaintiff. He felt that the burden should be on the defendant. He used a child support case as an example. He stressed that the burden should be on the party trying to change the contract. Mr. Stark stressed that it is not a monetary contract. He emphasized that it is a policy choice. He spoke in support of placing the burden on the plaintiff, to allow the state the maximum flexibility to manage the prison system. Co-Chair Therriault stressed that plaintiffs can push for an actual court judgement. Mr. Stark reiterated that at the end of two years, if the state felt that it was no longer in violation of the law, it could move to terminate or modify the order. The burden would be on the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a continuing, current violation in order for the order to continue. Representative Grussendorf pointed out that the courts cannot force the legislature to appropriate money to address problems identified by the court. He pointed out that the Department of Corrections has been able to use Cleary to leverage more funding. He stated that it should be up to the plaintiffs to prove that the state has not corrected the deficiencies. Mr. Stark maintained that the state of Alaska's correctional system is a safe system. He asserted that it is one of the best in the country. He noted that the Department of Corrections and the Department of Law would be leery if the legislature looked at the legislation as a green light to slash funding for corrections. Representative J. Davies questioned how the legislation would limit decent decrees or the ability of court decisions to be based on anything other than a right defined in the legislation. Mr. Stark stated that it limits the ability of courts to order prospective relief to any litigation involving prison conditions to situations where the plaintiffs have shown there is a violation of a federal or state right. If the plaintiff can demonstrated that the state has violated a statute and an inmate or class of inmates have been injured by the action, then the court has the authority to order corrective measures. Mr. Stark pointed out that subsection (e) page 4, line 8 allows the court to approve a consent decree for up to two years. At that time that plaintiff would have to demonstrate that some right is being violated that was addressed in the initial lawsuit. The federal law does not allow consent decrees. The federal act only allows the court to order relief when there has been a demonstrated violation of a right. He observed that the intent is to allow flexibility to accommodate concerns. Damages have to be paid by the state, subject to appropriation by the legislature. Representative J. Davies asked how class action claims would be limited. Mr. Stark referred to page 2, line 24 When a court finds multiple violations of a state or federal right, when multiple remedies are ordered by the prospective relief, or when prospective relief applies to multiple correctional facilities, the findings required by this subsection shall be made as to each violation, each remedy, and each facility, as appropriate. In a civil action with respect to correctional facility conditions that has been certified as a class action, prospective relief applicable to the class may only be ordered after the court makes the findings required by this subsection and finds that the violation of a state or federal right is applicable to the entire class." The relief ordered must be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. The court has to find that the violation of the state or federal right is applicable to the entire class. This is consistent with federal litigation. The court has the right to order relief for individuals, but cannot order sytem wide releif unless it is demonstrated that the entire class is affected. Representative Grussendorf pointed out that under Cleary the state paid the fines to its own General Fund. BILL PARKER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS stated that the department supports the legislation. He pointed out that it has been 19 years since the case was filed. The settlement has been in place for 9 years. The main issue is overcrowding. All of the institutions are on or below their Cleary cap except for the Cook Inlet Pretrial facility, which cannot be addressed until the new Anchorage jail is built. He stated that the major issues have been addressed and the department is capable of carrying on without constant court oversight. Representative J. Davies asked if the court oversight was helpful in making arguments to the legislature that appropriations were necessary for additional beds. Mr. Parker stressed that the increase in prison population was the main influence on the department's budget. There were approximately 770 prisoners in 1980. There are currently approximately 4,300 prisoners. He pointed out that there would be some savings if Cleary were lifted. The department has additional administrative cost associated with the settlement. He noted that the department pays the court monitor's fees. Representative Foster MOVED to report CSHB 214 (JUD) out of Committee with the accompanying fiscal note. There being NO OBJECTION, it was so ordered. CSHB 214 (JUD) was REPORTED out of Committee with a "do pass" recommendation and with a fiscal impact note by the Department of Corrections dated 5/3/99.
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